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Explaining the democratic anchorage of governance 
networks: evidence from four European countries 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Advances in understanding the democratic anchorage of governance networks require 
carefully designed and contextually grounded empirical analysis that take into account 
contextual factors.  The article uses a conjectural framework to study the impact of the 
national ‘democratic milieu’ on the relationship between network governance and 
representative institutions in four European countries - the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. The article shows that the distinction between majoritarian and 
consensus democracy, as well as the varying strength of voluntary associations are important 
contextual factors that help understand cross-national differences in the relationship between 
governance networks and representative institutions. We conclude that a context of weak 
associationalism in majoritarian democracies facilitates the instrumentalization of networks 
by governmental actors (United Kingdom), whereas while in consensus democracies a more 
complementary role of governance networks prevails (Switzerland). However, in consensus 
democracies characterised by a context of strong associationalism (the Netherlands and 
Denmark), the spread of governance networks in public policy-making is likely to lead to 
more substantial transformations of the democratic processes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last decades the role and function of governance networks - defined as “public policy 
making and implementation through a web of relationships between government, business 
and civil society actors” (Klijn, 2008: 511) - has attracted considerable attention. In the 1990s 
a first generation of governance network research explained how this form could be 
distinguished from hierarchical and market approaches, and analysed how and under what 
conditions it contributed to the production of effective governance. Recently, a second 
generation of research has examined the democratic impact of governance networks, and the 
extent to which they have „democratic anchorage‟, that is, a system of metagovernance 
regulated by elected politicians (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005).  However, most empirical 
research into the democratic consequences of governance networks has been undertaken in 
the context of a single country (Skelcher, 2007).  The absence of cross-national comparison 
means that scholars are unable to establish the extent to which there are regional or global 
uniformities (e.g. whether network governance inevitably reduces transparency of public 
policy) or, conversely, whether the institutionalised norms and practices of democracy in 
individual countries has a mediating effect (e.g. by fostering greater citizen engagement in 
one country rather than another).    
 
This article reports on an initial comparative cross-national study of the democratic 
consequences of governance networks.  It was designed both to generate new knowledge and 
to stimulate colleagues to undertake similar multi-country research.  Cross-national 
comparative research is important for the study of governance networks and democracy, as in 
other fields, because it helps increase the critical edge of scholarship (Blondel 2005).  It 
challenges researchers by questioning the findings and taken-for-granted assumptions from 
single country studies, and helps the field move from generalised statements to a more refined 
perspective that can accommodate variation in the institutionalised features of „how 
democracy means‟ and „how we do democracy‟ in different nations.   
 
Our comparative research strategy starts from a consideration of the relationship between 
governance networks and representative democracy.  We focus on representative democracy 
because this is the ideal underpinning the institutional arrangements in most countries 
claiming to be „democratic‟, including the four countries that we study.  We use a conjectural 
framework to formulate the possible general relationships between governance networks and   
representative democracy, and then refine these into propositions that refer to the democratic 
milieu in each of our case study countries – Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom.  By democratic milieu, we mean the collectively shared meanings and 
practices of democracy in that country, which is , as we discuss, a somewhat broader concept 
than the more commonly used idea of „political culture‟.  Then, we present a country by 
country analysis within this overall framework, and end by drawing comparative conclusions 
concerning the relationship between democratic milieu and the democratic anchorage of 
governance networks.  
FOUR CONJECTURES – AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The analytical framework is based on four conjectures about the relationships between 
representative democracy and governance networks (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). Conjectures are 
provisional theories that offer a plausible explanation to the research problem, and provide a 
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basis from which further investigation and theorising can proceed. The use of conjectures 
provides a helpful way of exploring a problem in which there are limited data, or incomplete 
understandings of the variables involved and their relationships. The current empirical 
knowledge about the democratic anchorage of governance networks is such that the use of 
conjectures seems appropriate. In sum, there are four conjectures about the relationship 
between governance networks and representative democracy, namely the incompatibility 
conjecture, the complementarity conjecture, the transitional conjecture and the instrumental 
conjecture (table 1). 
 
-------- table 1 about here -------- 
 
The Incompatibility Conjecture 
 
The incompatibility conjecture posits that representative democracy and governance networks 
conflict because each is predicated on a different set of institutional rules. Sørensen (2006) 
identifies four issues where representative democracy and governance networks collide. First, 
governance networks challenges the sovereign power of the elected body because they depend 
on a high level of autonomy. Second, governance networks are constituted on a functional and 
not a territorial logic of representation. Third, public administrators tend to become policy 
makers in and through their participation in governance networks. Fourth, governance 
networks undermine the classical institutional separation between the public and the private 
sphere in traditional theories of representative democracy by bringing together stakeholders 
from state, market and civil society.  
 
This approach to governance networks emphasises the closed and compartmentalised nature 
of decision-making in separate policy sectors, and the limited accessibility to these by non-
specialised and poorly organised interest groups. The relatively closed and sector-divided 
character of the decision-making in governance networks means that it is primarily sector 
specialists and other experts participate in the networks at the expense of elected politicians 
(Heisler, 1974; Koppenjan, Ringeling & te Velde, 1987). Consequently, the incompatibility 
conjecture focuses on the way governance networks interfere with the principles of the 
primacy of politics and the political accountability of ministers and other elected, executive 
officeholders.   
 
The Complementarity Conjecture 
 
The second conjecture suggests that governance networks engage more actors in the policy 
process than the institutions of representative democracy. As such it can be seen as a means to 
enhance the level of citizen participation in representative democracy. This kind of 
stakeholder involvement is viewed as valuable due to a new complexity of the problems that 
modern governance processes address (Rhodes, 1988; Pierre & Peters, 2000).  There are two 
types of complexity. One is a function of the issues facing governments such as 
environmental problems, security and labour market issues (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). In the 
other, new policy agendas are superimposed on the earlier cleavages in society around which 
constitutional arrangement in advanced liberal states were designed (Lijphart, 1999). Among 
these new cleavages we find religion, ethnicity, cultural orientation, and sexuality.  All tend to 
challenge the notions of shared citizenship that is the cornerstone in the legitimacy basis of 
representative democracy.  
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Governance networks are viewed as a valuable flexible institutional design to mediate the 
relationship of representative democracy with citizens and other parties. Hence, governance 
networks provides quasi-governmental institutions within which different groups can take 
direct part in decision making processes that directly affect them in close collaboration with 
public actors. By doing so governance networks are said to contribute to democracy in several 
ways (Fung & Wright, 2001; Papadopoulos, 2000). First, the creation of new institutions 
offers greater opportunities for participation in all phases of the policy process. Thereby they 
help to raise the level of public engagement, as well as the level of information that 
governments have about the citizens‟ actual needs and preferences. Second, governance 
networks negotiate outcomes that transcend partial preferences. Finally, governance networks 
helps to build  social capital and political efficacy government (McLaverty, 2002). The 
complementary view thus sees governance networks as a valuable addition to representative 
democracy. 
 
The Transitional Conjecture 
 
This conjecture proposes a general transformation of the governance processes in Western 
democracies that affects the functioning of representative democracy in fundamental ways.  
Governance processes increasingly takes the form of complicated negotiation processes where 
public policy problems are ill-defined, require novel solutions, affect many values, and draw 
on knowledge that is dispersed (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Theories of deliberative 
democracy are seen as a central contribution to develop a new interactive form of democracy 
that rely on the active involvement of citizens and other societal actors in order to obtain 
legitimacy (Papadopoulos, 2003).  The current transition phase inevitably produces tensions 
between old and new forms of democratic governance.  This tension emerges among other 
things as a tension between representative democracy and governance networks (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000). Elected politicians fear that interactive decision-making threatens their 
primacy as decision-makers while governance networks view governments as a threat towards 
their autonomy and capacity for self-governance.  
 
The transitional conjecture argues that this tension can be reduced through a reformulation of 
the roles of elected politicians from being sovereign rulers to becoming meta-governors that 
frame self-governing processes in a way that gives an overall direction and promotes the 
democratic quality of self-governing processes (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Sørensen, 2006). 
From the transition perspective democracy becomes more a societal model than a 
representational model. Democracy becomes a process of deliberation that has to be organised 
and guided carefully to enhance its open character, and supported by multiple forms of 
accountability. In the transitional conjecture, democracy is a design task to be implemented in 
real life practice of governance networks. It is both a high ideal but also a pragmatic task.   
 
The Instrumental Conjecture 
 
The instrumental conjecture views governance networks as a medium through which 
powerful governmental actors can increase their capacity to shape and deliver public policy in 
a complex world. Governance networks provide an instrument to structure the inputs to and 
outcomes from the policy process so that their alignment with dominant agendas is increased. 
Theoretically, the instrumental approach can be located either in a notion of local elite 
strategies or the wider debate about changing forms of social regulation in a neo-liberal 
context. In either case, the instrumental perspective starts from the premise that the interests 
of governmental actors are relatively immutable and exist prior to any wider engagement with 
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stakeholders. Governance networks provide a means of reinforcing these dominant interests 
(through the input structure) and realising them (through the output structure). In contrast, 
both the complementary and transitional approaches assume that interests are transitive, being 
refined and redefined through dialogue and deliberation between elected politicians and their 
officials on the one hand, and the various publics on the other. 
 
In terms of this conjecture, governance networks offer a means for elected politicians to 
realise their policy platforms through the application of governance networks in an 
instrumental fashion.  For example, the use of such networks to promote vertical linkages that 
cut across multiple tiers of government can enhance local delivery of national policy intent. 
Governance networks provide resources to enable government to extend and reproduce its 
policy agenda into a new arena, and enhance the possibilities of realising its broader goals (Le 
Galès, 2001). In this conjecture accountability is secured by the strong involvement of 
political office holders who remain responsible. Other accountability measures (such as 
performance management) are designed to support the accountability of the central political 
stakeholder. 
 
The power of elected politicians 
 
The four conjectures each provide their own understanding of the relationship between 
governance networks and elected politicians. With regard to the incompatibility and 
instrumental conjectures, they both assume that power is associated with the authority of 
elected politicians who make strategic decisions that entail a cascade of lower-order decisions 
for other actors in the network. This is either because elected politicians are part of 
representative institutions that aggregate the will of the citizens (as is argued by the 
incompatibility conjecture), or because elected politicians are endowed with qualities that 
enable them legitimately to act as principals shaping the incentive structures in governance 
networks (as is argued by the instrumental conjecture). The remaining two conjectures 
portend different views regarding the power of elected politicians. The complementarity 
conjecture considers that, while ultimate decision authority remains with elected politicians, 
governance networks facilitate the sharing of this authority with various societal groups who, 
in turn, provide elected politicians with support, knowledge and implementation capacity. 
This exchange between elected politicians and societal groups is seen as a basis for the 
enhancement of civic engagement and of pluralism in policy-making. Finally, the transitional 
conjecture emphasises that actors in governance networks strongly depend on each other, and 
that this situation strengthens veto powers rather than power to achieve positive goals. Thus, 
elected politicians are certainly not the only powerful actor in governance networks, and not 
necessarily the most powerful ones. Their power is dissolved and relocated from the 
institutions of representative democracy to the governance network itself.  
 
DEMOCRATIC MILIEU AS AN EXPRESSION OF CONTEXT 
The four conjectures are useful in sharpening theoretical thinking and in guiding empirical 
research into the relationship between governance networks and representative democracy. 
However, it is obvious that they are largely insensitive to contextual elements that may 
influence the relationship between governance networks and representative democracy and 
thus the likeliness of the various conjectures to occur in different settings.  
 
Democratic milieus and the four conjectures  
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There is a long strand of research in comparative political sociology to show that the 
relationship between the state and civil society varies across national borders (Badie & 
Birnbaum, 1994). Any cross-national examination of the relationship between societal groups 
and elected politicians must therefore be able to single out the influence that the nature of the 
national context might have on this relationship. We capture this contextual influence via the 
notion of „democratic milieu‟, which points to the collectively shared meanings and practices 
attributed by the involved actors to the features of the organisation or institution with which 
they are associated.  This captures something of the legacy of historically rooted institutions 
located in a specific spatial and/or policy setting, as well as the possibilities emergent in new 
practices (Farrelly & Skelcher, forthcoming).   In addition, it concerns the ways in which their 
organisation or institution relates to and is conceived to interact with other organisations and 
institutions that make up the national polity. Therefore, cross-national variations of 
democratic milieu need to account for differences regarding the interactions between these 
two actor categories and their respective organisations or institutions.  
 
Lijphart‟s (1999) distinction between consensus and majoritarian patterns of democracy 
enables the operationalization of cross-national variations of the democratic milieu.  Lijphart 
argues that democracies should be distinguished by looking at variables that tend, on the one 
hand, to favor majoritarian decision-making thanks to concentration of power, or, on the other 
hand, require consensual decision-making due to power being shared between a plurality of 
different actors. The relevance of Lijphart‟s distinction for the question under scrutiny here is 
clear: in majoritarian democracies, power is concentrated within representative institutions - 
hence lies with elected politicians - while in consensus democracies, power is more dispersed 
not only within representative institutions, but also between representative institutions and 
societal actors such as interest groups. With respect to the relationships between governance 
networks and representative institutions, we can expect that, in majoritarian democracies, the 
(traditionally strong) power of elected politicians is more at stake than in consensual 
democracies where one is used to share power between elected politicians and other societal 
actors. In other words, we can assume that the above described incompatibility and 
instrumental conjectures are more likely to be found in majoritarian democracies, while the 
complementarity and transitional conjectures are more likely for consensual democracies. 
 
Further, we argue that the level of social capital is a crucial characteristic of the democratic 
milieu. Putnam (1993) argues that the nature of the civic community is important to 
democracy in the sense that strong engagement of citizens in secondary associations - i.e. 
organisations outside state institutions - tends to foster values and behaviour that are crucial to 
making democracy work, namely political equality, solidarity, trust and tolerance. So the 
general strength of the associational nexus in a given society can also be assumed to shape 
relationships between governance networks (as they involve non-state actors) and 
representative institutions. A context of strong associationalism confers governance networks 
an independent power base that enables them to resist control and direction from 
representative institutions. Instead, a context characterised by associational weakness puts 
representative institutions into advantage. Hence, we propose that in a democratic milieu 
characterised by strong associationalism governance networks will more likely be „at eye 
level‟ with representative institutions, with whom they can either be in conflict 
(incompatibility conjecture) or negotiate effectively to transform decision-making and 
redefine democratic practice (transitional conjecture). On the other hand, in a context of weak 
associationalism it will be easier for representative institutions to dominate governance 
networks (instrumental conjecture) or steer them in a way to engage civil society more fully 
in public policy making (complementarity conjecture).  Taken together, these considerations 
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suggest that four types of democratic milieus should be distinguished, in which the four 
conjectures are more or less likely to prevail (Table 2).  
 
--- Table 2 about here ---- 
 
Four countries and their democratic milieu 
 
From the above considerations, clear hypotheses can be formulated regarding contextual 
influences on the relationship between governance networks and representative institutions in 
the four countries under scrutiny here, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Denmark and the 
Netherlands.  These four countries were selected because they provided sufficient variety to 
enable comparison within the model set out above, and in each the authors had been 
investigating these issues in their own nationally-oriented and comparative research projects. 
 
Regarding patterns of democracy, Lijphart argues that the United Kingdom and its 
Westminster model is a good example of a majoritarian democracy, while Switzerland lies at 
the opposite pole as a typical consensus democracy. Denmark can be classified as a 
consensual democracy with a distinctively Scandinavian culture of consensus and structures 
for conciliation (1999: 250). The Netherlands is more difficult to position. According to 
Lijphart it has gradually moved away from the consensual style since the 1970s (1999: 256), 
which is all the more remarkable as most other countries in continental Europe (including 
Denmark) have moved in the opposite direction in the same period. But other authors argue 
that the dominant style is still very consensual and oriented towards negotiation (Hendriks & 
Toonen, 2000). It is also clear that the Netherlands, with its proportional representation, 
coalition governments and tradition of consensus is a far less strong example of a majoritarian 
democracy than the UK. However we still regard the Netherlands as more majoritan than 
Denmark. This classification is corroborated by a recent analysis that also found Denmark to 
be more consensual than the Netherlands (Vatter & Bernauer, 2009: 352). 
 
In order to measure the strength of associationalism in these four countries, we follow the 
approach used by recent cross-national studies on membership in voluntary organisations 
(Dekker & van den Broek, 2005; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). We use item B13-
19 in the European Social Survey 2006, in which respondents were asked whether, in the last 
12 months, they had worked in an organisation or association that was neither a political party 
nor an action group, in order to determine the average national ratio of active membership in 
voluntary associations. For all the 26 countries covered in the 2006 European Social Survey, 
14% of respondents declared active involvement in voluntary associations in the twelve 
months prior to interview. While the results for the United Kingdom (9%) and Switzerland 
(13%) are below this overall average, the results for Denmark (25%) and the Netherlands 
(24%) are clearly above.  The four countries under scrutiny can hence be considered to 
present four distinct democratic milieus (Table 3).  
 
--- Table 3 about here ---- 
 
THE FOUR COUNTRIES COMPARED 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper uses an „expert informant‟ approach.  Each country case 
is written by a scholar with extensive experience of the literature on and research into 
governance networks and democracy in each country.  The brief was to write a case study that 
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used the available evidence to discuss: the origins of governance networks; how they relate to 
the democratic milieu; the role of elected politicians in networks; and a conclusion that relates 
back to the four conjectures.  Given space constraints, the sections are inevitably brief and are 
intended to provide an overview of the key features of what are quite complex processes in 
each country.  References offer additional evidence, and access to the domestic debates 
regarding the evolution and relationship between governance networks and representative 
democracy. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Origins of governance networks 
 
The significance of governance networks in the United Kingdom (UK) was identified by 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) and their collaborators in studies of the structured incorporation of 
business, labor and other special interest groups in national level policy formulation. The 
period of Conservative government in the 1980s and 1990s dislocated these embedded 
patterns of relationships, but also began a process of building local-level collaboration in 
policy implementation in which business and citizen interests were given greater weight 
relative to local government through their formal incorporation into new institutions of 
governance (Skelcher, 2004).   
 
Since the late 1990s, there has been a substantial increase in „stakeholder‟ engagement with 
government at (and more recently between) all levels of government.  Newman (2001) locates 
the momentum for governance networks within the discourse of „modernisation‟, a New 
Labour project to recast political, economic, social, and cultural relations in UK society.  A 
broad „pro-modernisation‟ coalition promotes the widespread use of governance networks.  
This reflects congruence between the interests of national government in promoting 
collaborative and inclusive policy making, managers who see advantages in terms of their 
increased authority and discretion, and political actors who recognise the opportunities of 
finding new ways of engaging with local communities (Stoker, 2004; Sullivan, 2004). 
 
Governance networks are often consolidated into a „partnership‟ - a board or committee that 
forms the node in each wider network (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). Partnerships cover a 
wide range of public policy issues, including urban regeneration, crime reduction, health 
improvement, environmental sustainability, and supporting asylum seekers and refugees.  The 
proliferation of governance networks across the public policy landscape has led to complaints 
from civil society and business who have experienced considerable difficulties in mustering 
the capacity to respond to all of the potential „partnership‟ opportunities (Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister, 2006; Sullivan, 2008). Despite this, policy makers‟ appetite for governance 
networks has not abated, with increasing attention being paid to developing strategic level 
networks whose role is to determine and deliver local policy outcomes via formalised 
agreements with national government.   
 
The relationship to the English democratic milieu 
 
The United Kingdom fits neatly into Lijphart‟s (1999) description of a majoritarian system. It 
is a unitary state where power remains concentrated in the hands of centre affording national 
representative institutions significant influence. This pattern has repeated itself in the 
devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales from 1999. Importantly the constitutional 
status of local government is not safeguarded and there is a long tradition of central 
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government intervention to reshape the governance of local affairs (Stewart, 2000). In this 
context the development of governance networks can be understood within the terms of the 
instrumental conjecture with local governance networks providing a key route for the delivery 
of national policy objectives. 
 
Governance networks or partnerships seldom require national legislation, and are formed with 
little public debate. A powerful incentive to their creation has been the creation by national 
government of special funds, accessible only by partnerships of public, business and civil 
society actors.  National policy also emphasises the engagement of stakeholders in 
governance networks, including special funding for the „capacity building‟ of community 
representatives. The need for this kind of intervention could be attributed to the relatively 
weak associationalism in the UK, although its impact has been variable (Taylor, 2003).  In 
keeping with the instrumental conjecture governance networks in the UK have traditional 
been subject to minimal constitutional safeguards (Skelcher, Mathur & Smith, 2005).  The 
strongest forms of accountability are to higher levels of government, for public funding and 
the delivery of performance targets.  But in contrast, general democratic oversight is limited.   
 
However, the UK case also provides evidence to support the complementary conjecture.  
Stakeholder engagement is based on a view of society segmented into groups organised 
around different interests, and where democracy consists of these interests being directly 
represented in public policy making rather than aggregated and mediated by elected 
politicians.  Such stakeholders are understood to be structured in terms of business, non-
profit, and community sectors, the latter being further divisible on locational, ethnicity, 
identity, faith, and other grounds.  However the ability of governance networks to deliver 
improved engagement is limited.  Problems arise from the way „publics‟ are constituted by 
the state for inclusion in governance networks (Barnes, Newman, Knops, & Sullivan, 2003; 
Taylor, 2003) and from the processes of incorporation that can result when citizen actors 
come into contact with state led institutions (Lowndes & Sullivan, 2004).  
 
The power of elected politicians in governance networks 
 
Research evidence records widespread disconnection between local politicians and local 
partnerships (Geddes, 2006; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2006). A strong 
managerialist discourse locates partnerships as part of an implementation structure rather than 
as policy-making bodies (Skelcher, Mathur & Smith, 2005). Consequently elected politicians 
are framed as higher-order decision-makers (meta-governors) in relation to lower-order 
partnerships, in keeping with the features of the instrumental conjecture.  The resulting 
structural gap enables public managers to exercise considerable discretion, including over the 
design of the institution, its forms of democratic anchorage and the definition of the publics to 
be included (Barnes, Newman, Knops, & Sullivan, 2003).  In practice this metagoverning role 
was quite weak until the mid 2000s when a national reappraisal of the role of elected local 
politicians resulted in national policy endorsement of their role as „strategic leaders‟ of local 
partnerships (e.g. Communities and Local Government, 2006; Sullivan, 2008). This has 
generated mixed reactions from other „stakeholders‟, many of whom acknowledge the 
„primus inter pares‟ role of local government but are also apprehensive about what they 
perceive to be a resurgence of local government „dominance‟.  
 
Conclusion 
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The predominant aspects of the democratic milieu that this case illustrates are those of the 
informal constitution that can be changed on a pragmatic basis.  The United Kingdom is not a 
constitutional polity.  The institutions of governance are not designed with reference to 
universal democratic principles. In a unitary state, where local institutions are not protected 
by a constitution, this means that there is considerable scope for national government to 
change and adapt as it sees fit. Hence the instrumental conjecture predominates in our 
analysis. 
 
But alongside this is also the complementary conjecture.  There is clear evidence of the 
opening-up of local decision-making to a wider spread of actors, even if there are difficulties 
in this process.  The combination of instrumental and complementary is not accidental.  
Modernisation as a political strategy requires the reshaping of local governmental institutions 
to affect both enhanced delivery of public policy and greater legitimacy from stakeholders.  
The resultant governance networks, and their partnership nodes, provide the constitutional 
flexibility to enable both the managerialisation necessary for the policy delivery and 
participation necessary for legitimation.  This happens under the broad oversight of 
representative democratic institutions at local level, expressed through their managers, and 
with limited direct involvement by elected local politicians. 
 
Switzerland 
 
Origins of governance networks 
 
The Swiss state is generally considered as the prototype of a weak state (Badie and Birnbaum, 
1994). As a corollary, governance networks have always played an important role in policy-
making, both with respect to formulation and implementation. At the national level, 
corporatist delegation of state authority to private interest governments (PIG) (Streeck & 
Schmitter, 1985) is a long-standing feature in many policy fields, ranging from the regulation 
of vocational education to various aspects of agricultural policy. At the sub-national level, and 
especially in social policy, there is an equally long-standing tradition of subsidiarity, featuring 
the autonomous delivery of public services by non-profit-organisations subsidised by the state 
(Bütschi & Cattachin, 1993). 
 
These traditions have strongly evolved since the 1980s, in the wake of a neo-liberal reform 
agenda. PIGs have been dismantled in many sectors, transforming corporatist entrenchments 
into more pluralist patterns of policy making (see Mach, 2007; Wagemann, 2005), while 
public private partnerships have emerged as a core element for the delivery of public services 
(Schedler, 2000).  Consequently, state authorities at both national and sub-national levels 
have taken a more proactive role in their collaboration with non-profit sector organisations 
(Bütschi & Cattacin, 1993). This has strengthened the role of state agencies in governance 
networks, vis-à-vis business or civil society associations.  
 
The relationship to the Swiss democratic milieu 
 
Switzerland has a consensus democracy working in a culturally heterogeneous and 
fractionalised society. Additionally, the Swiss polity is characterised by extensive direct 
democracy, which has brought about additional mechanisms aiming to integrate and pacify 
potential opposition (Neidhart, 1970). As a consequence, policy formulation at all state levels 
is characterised by negotiation and the search for compromise among a multitude of societal 
groups both outside and within representative institutions, before final decisions are taken in 
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popular votes (see Sciarini, 2007).  This is a favourable climate to governance networks (see 
Kriesi, 1995). The role of governance networks is thus best understood within the 
complementarity conjecture, supporting existing arrangements by extending consociational 
relationships into new policy fields outside the traditional realms of political negotiation.  
 
The second element of the Swiss democratic milieu, namely weak associationalism, has also 
shaped governance networks. Faced with low degrees of civil society organisation in new 
policy issues, state agencies have resorted to what Bütschi and Cattacin (1993) have termed 
“reflexive subsidiarity”, i.e. when the state (financially) supports the setting up of voluntary 
associations whom it then invites to join governance networks and play a substantial role in 
the implementation of state policies. This strongly echoes the instrumental conjecture where 
governance networks are seen a resource to powerful state actors. However, closer analysis 
shows that even though voluntary associations are state-creatures in origin, their involvement 
in governance networks enables them to gain sufficient momentum and autonomy to resist 
state interventions and they have even been able to triumph over attempts to weaken them 
(Neuenschwander, 2005).  
 
The power of elected politicians in governance networks 
 
Governance networks in Switzerland come in many different forms, and there are no overall 
rules on how actors that participate relate to each other. Transparency of governance networks 
is generally poor. Unlike representative institutions, there is no statutory right for public 
scrutiny with respect to decision making bodies of governance networks. Case studies of 
drugs policy, public transport, cultural policy and water provision have shown that lines of 
accountability are blurred in governance networks (Kübler & Schwab, 2007).  The budgetary 
process seems to provide the main link for connecting governance networks to both elected 
politicians in representative institutions, as well as the electorate through direct democratic 
instruments (Wälti, Kübler, & Papadopoulos, 2004). Legal procedures for budget or credit 
approval generally stipulate a cascade of decisions by different bodies (the executive, 
parliament, electorate) according to the amount that is involved. Since the delivery of public 
policies by governance networks generally involves a transfer of public funds, the procedures 
for budget approval provide the main link to the democratic sphere. 
 
These findings are in line with the dominant discourse about the role of elected politicians in 
public policy-making. The wave of public management reform that has swept over 
Switzerland in the 1990s has (re)defined the role of elected politicians. Echoing Osborne and 
Gaebler‟s (1993) famous distinction between “steering and rowing”, one of the characteristic 
features of New Public Management, Swiss style, consists in separating strategic aspects of 
decision making from operational aspects of administrative execution (Germann, 1999; 
Schedler, 2000). This redefines the role of the elected politicians, be they national or local: 
whereas operational choices are left to the discretion of the bureaucracy (or governance 
networks), strategic choices are the privilege of elected politicians who are thereby 
transformed into meta-governors.  
 
However, the accuracy of this view has been heavily questioned in the Swiss context. On a 
conceptual level, Germann (1999) has refuted it as a revival of an outdated dogma from the 
American Progressive Era according to which politics should be clearly separated from 
administration. Given that “the mixing up of politics and administration has a long secular 
tradition and is deeply anchored in Swiss institutions of direct democracy” (Germann 1999: 
209), this redefined role of elected politicians seems all the more inadequate. In a similar line, 
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others have argued that separating strategic from operational decision making weakens 
representative institutions and will, ultimately, result in re-politicising of implementation 
processes (see particularly Knoepfel, 1996). Recent empirical research (Widmer & Rüegg, 
2005; Widmer & Rieder, 2007) has shown that, indeed, elected politicians in Switzerland do 
not at all confine themselves to the role of meta-governors. Rather, they do not hesitate to 
behave as micro-governors by interfering in administrative processes. The public bureaucracy 
is often subject to scrutiny by elected politicians, but also governance networks that perform 
functions in the wake of particular policy programmes. In the social policy field, Wälti, 
Kübler, and Papadopoulos (2004: 106) found “little evidence that governance [networks] tend 
to uncouple political issues from the traditional arenas of democratic legitimization and from 
public debate”. A reduced influence of elected politicians in governance networks has thus 
not been diagnosed in Switzerland. This situation is best understood within the 
complementarity conjecture, emphasising that ultimate decision authority remains with 
elected politicians. 
  
Conclusion 
 
The context of negotiation democracy in a heterogeneous and fragmented society has 
provided a favourable climate to governance networks in Switzerland ever since. Governance 
networks appear as a functional addition to the existing consociational arrangements. Even 
though governance networks have become an instrument for the state to expand into new 
policy fields, there are strong limits to state discretion, as even weak voluntary associations 
have successfully resisted outright instrumentalization.  In terms of democratic anchorage, 
governance networks in Switzerland are best described by the complementary conjecture. 
Indeed, legal procedures – especially the budgetary process – provide systematic linkages of 
governance networks to decision making in representative institutions. In addition, elected 
politicians have proved quite reluctant to embrace the new role of meta-governors foreseen by 
public management reforms. The evidence suggests that decisional authority of representative 
institutions has not been reduced by the proliferation of governance networks.  
 
 
The Netherlands 
 
The origins of network governance 
 
The Netherlands has traditionally been a pillarized society (Socialist, Protestant, Catholic, 
Liberal), each having its own organizational structures (political parties, intermediate 
organizations) operating relatively separately from the others (Lijphart, 1984). Very similarly 
to Switzerland, decision-making in The Netherlands was based on a high degree of passivity 
and loyalty on the part of citizens and close contact between the elites of the political parties 
and third-sector (societal) associations. Thus strong elite leadership by the political leaders of 
the pillars was combined with strong consensualism between leaders and strong 
associationalism, which is densely organized social life within the pillars. Implementation 
was left to the societal organizations in each of the political pillars, which were closely 
affiliated with the political parties.  
 
This system of decision-making lasted until the end of the 1960s. Since then the Netherlands 
has witnessed a strong secularization process, where the traditional pillars lost their meaning 
(Hendriks & Toonen, 2000) and polarization has increased.  The growth of the welfare state 
resulted in groups of actors who specialize in particular sectors entering the decision-making 
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process (Koppenjan, Ringeling, & te Velde, 1987; Van den Berg & Molleman, 1975; Van 
Putten, 1982). This created knowledge and resources interdependencies between public, 
private and semi-private actors. In addition, there has been a growing need for integrated 
solutions for problems which surpass sectors.  The result has been a more complex form of 
decision-making, which can be regarded as governance networks, operating at national, 
regional and local levels.   
 
The increasing importance of governance networks is also shown by the growing number of 
interactive decision-making processes in Dutch municipalities, and occasionally at national 
level (see Denters, van Heffen, Huisman, & Klok, 2003; Edelenbos & Monninkhof, 2001).  
Here, stakeholders are invited to participate in the decision-making process in an early phase 
(before solutions are developed) (see Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). 
 
The relationship to the Dutch democratic milieu 
 
The evidence about the emergence of governance networks in the Netherlands, taken over the 
longer term, suggests that the network character of decision-making increases as does the 
involvement of additional actors. This trend towards governance networks also fits the Dutch 
political administrative system (a decentralised unitary state) in which local governments 
have considerable power, but there is also regular negotiation between central and local public 
bodies. This points the transitional conjecture in which the already consociational democratic 
and political system of the Netherlands slowly converts itself to something of which we can 
not yet see the whole contour, but could be considered a network democracy.  
 
However, there are trends which do not fit in this picture and point at the incompatibility 
conjecture. These include the strong call for leadership by citizens and discussion of ways to 
curtail the involvement of external actors (and especially their legal rights) so that decision-
making on complex issues can be speeded up. These suggest a tension between the rules and 
requirements of governance networks, which focus on mutual interaction, negotiation and the 
development of shared commitment by actors, and the more vertical accountability structure 
of representational democracy (Klijn, 2008). This also fits in the trend of the last 10 years in 
which public confidence in political parties and political leaders has diminished and social 
discontent has risen (Dekker, van der Meer, Schyns, & Steenvorden, 2009).  
 
The large number of actors involved in governance networks reduces their transparency. 
However different accountability mechanisms are developed before or during decision-
making processes, and democratic legitimacy is achieved in various ways including public 
hearings, collective agreements on processes, and normal democratic procedures.  
 
Governance networks and elected politicians 
 
In the formal sense representative political institutions still hold considerable power since 
most decisions sooner or later have to pass these institutions and elected city officials usually 
have strong positions in the networks. However this view of a complementarity conjecture is 
challenged by research which shows that the authority of representational bodies is weaker 
than their formal position suggests (Edelenbos, 2000; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Edelenbos & 
Monninkhof, 2001). Although political bodies are involved in designing the rules for 
interactive decision making, they are frequently absent from the process itself. Additionally 
research on environmental projects shows that there is no correlation between the 
involvement of political bodies or political parties and project outcomes, but there is a 
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relatively strong correlation between the involvement of stakeholders and positive outcomes 
(Edelenbos, Steijn, & Klijn, forthcoming). This suggests that stakeholders do significantly 
contribute to outcomes in governance networks, and so it could be argued that, for them, 
networks are understood within the instrumental conjecture.  This leads to a „displacement of 
politics‟ in which important decision are framed and taken at places other than in the 
institutions of representative government. The stronger duality installed at the turn of the 
century in Dutch politics which led city and provincial councils concentrating more on a 
controlling task may have contributed to a less prominent role of elected bodies and a more 
prominent role of individual elected officials. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Superficially the emergence of governance networks seems to fit in the typical Dutch 
consociationalism style of policy making in which actors negotiate with each other. However 
they do give political organisations and representative government a less prominent position 
in the whole process, despite the fact that their formal position is still strong.  In that sense the 
transitional conjecture seems a reasonable model to describe and explain the developments. 
There are also, however, signs which point at tensions between governance networks and 
representative democracy, especially as the traditional pillarized model has reduced in 
significance. It is as yet unclear whether this can be explained as a sign that the transition is 
not always smooth, or more fundamentally reflects the incompatibility conjecture. 
 
 
Denmark 
 
Origins of governance networks 
 
Denmark has a long history of a very strong state and a very strong civil society (Knudsen, 
1991), and governance networks have served as a means to bridge these sectors, resolve 
conflicts, and enhance cooperation and coordination through the shaping of negotiated 
agreements. In policy areas such as labour market policy and agriculture a strong corporatist 
tradition for networking between the state and the relevant interest organizations has 
prevailed, and within policy areas such as education, social services, culture and sports there 
are an even longer tradition for negotiated network cooperation between public actors and a 
broad variety of voluntary organisations (Bogason, 1990; 2000). However, from the 
beginning of the 1980s the systematic use of governance networks has spread into new policy 
areas such as business, tourism, regional development, environment, health and education, 
and they have become more institutionalized and legitimized (Bogason, 2001; Sørensen, 
2006).  
 
Although governance networks have a central place at the national and at local levels, the role 
that they play varies. National networks are predominantly engaged in policy making while 
local networks focus on policy implementation. However, since Denmark has a 
constitutionally ensured local level of government with a considerable degree of political 
competence and autonomy, local governance networks are also in many instances engaged in 
local policy making. National and local governance networks take many different forms. 
Some are relatively informal while others are formal; some networks are open and inclusive 
while others are closed and exclusive; some are initiated from below while others are initiated 
from above; some are metagoverned by public authorities while others are not.  
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One driving force behind the growth in governance networks is a positive view of their value 
among leading politicians and public administrators, notably the Ministry of Finance and the 
Association of Danish Municipalities (Sørensen, 2006; Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003).  
They see the involvement of stakeholders in public governance as a means provide more 
informed decisions, promote efficient implementation by reducing stakeholder resistance, and 
increase governance legitimacy by improving the responsiveness of the political system vis-à-
vis central stakeholders.       
 
The relationship to the democratic milieu in Denmark 
 
Denmark is not only characterized by a strong state and a strong civil society – it is also 
characterized by a strong national and local representative democracy and a strong 
participatory democracy. Seen in this context governance networks can be understood within 
the complementary conjecture as a way of linking national and local levels of representative 
democracy with various forms of democratic participation. This complementary view is 
expressed by a growing number of national politicians (Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003), and 
citizens (Andersen, Torpe & Andersen 2004) and in the concluding report of the Danish 
National Study of Power and Democracy (Togeby, Anderson, Christiansen, Jørgensen, & 
Vallgårda, 2003). 
 
Networks that are initiated and regulated by public authorities can also to some extent be 
understood within the instrumental conjecture as a new and more efficient means to 
implement public policy. However, it seems to be generally accepted that in order to be 
efficient governance networks need a considerable amount of autonomy and a considerable 
ability to affect the outcome of the processes of public governance in which they are involved. 
For that reason governance networks are not seen as neutral instruments for implementing 
public policies, but as active co-producers of public policy that has a direct effect on the 
policy outcome. In other words governance networks tend to be seen both as a form of 
governance and as a form of policy making that needs to be regulated democratically. 
Accordingly, one of the central debates in the Danish context concerns how representative 
democracy and democratic network participation are to complement each other. 
 
The transparency and accountability of Danish governance networks vary considerably. 
Formalized governance networks tend to be more transparent and accountable than informal 
networks. This is among other things due to the fact that formal networks are often 
metagoverned by public authorities in a way that contributes to ensuring some level of 
openness and broad inclusion in their constitution, and some degree of publicity and public 
attention. Informal governance networks are often less visible to the larger public and thus 
more difficult for public authorities and the larger public to hold to account. However, 
experience shows that deliberate efforts to metagovern informal governance networks, can 
increase their transparency and accountability (Sørensen, 2007).  
 
One of the major barriers for increasing the transparency and accountability of governance 
networks, however, is the narrow perception of the media on where and how politics is 
performed. The narrow media focus on the traditional political institutions of representative 
democracy means that they show little interest in the political role of governance networks. 
The effect is a low level of publicity and hence a limited transparency and accountability of 
formal as well as informal governance networks.  
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Governance networks and elected politicians 
 
When focussing on the role of elected politicians, the relationship between governance 
networks and representative democracy is best understood within the transitional conjecture 
as the increased institutionalization of the role of governance networks it goes hand in hand 
with a gradual transformation of the role of elected politicians. Hence, the role of national as 
well as municipal politicians has gradually been redefined from that of being sovereign 
decision makers to being meta-governors who govern through the framing of different forms 
of self-governance, network governance being one of them (Berg, 2000; Sørensen, 2003). 
This new image of what it means to be a politician, which is among other things promoted by 
the New Public Management doctrine, points out that politicians should not get involved in 
details and concrete governance affairs. Rather, they should concentrate on defining the 
overall political and budgetary goals that self-governing actors should pursue. The power of 
this new ideal typical image of what it means to be a good politician is illuminated by the fact 
that there are strong criticisms of politicians for being too occupied by detail and concrete 
governance issues.  In the Danish context the current efforts to reformulate the role of national 
and local politicians has led to a considerable reduction in their influence on public policy 
processes. This is due to the fact that the character and amount of the resources that Danish 
politicians have access to in their effort to exercise metagovernance are limited, leaving 
considerable space for the public administrators (Sørensen, 2006).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The strong tradition for close cooperation between public authorities and civil society, and the 
presence of strong constitutionally ensured local political institutions has led to the formation 
of a plurality of national and local governance networks that function as a supplement to the 
national and local institutions of representative democracy.  However, the recent growth in 
the number and importance of governance networks has to an increasing extent transformed 
the institutions of representative democracy through a gradual reinterpretation of the role of 
public authorities from that of being sovereign decision makers into being metagovernors that 
govern at a distance and leaves considerable autonomy to self-regulating governance 
networks and institutions. Seen from a transitional perspective on democracy, the 
development of a new role to politicians is promising but it is problematic that Danish 
politicians seem to end up playing  a marginal role in the metagovernance of governance 
networks and that the transparency and accountability of many governance networks tend to 
be relatively low.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Our analysis of the democratic anchorage of governance networks in four European countries 
has confirmed that there is a substantial cross-national variation in the relationship between 
governance networks and representative institutions (see also Table 4). In the United 
Kingdom governance networks are used by the central state for its own purposes, in order to 
deliver public policy locally with only marginal reference to elected representatives. In 
Switzerland, although governance networks operate in the shadow of consociationalism and 
largely outside public scrutiny, elected officials do have important influence over these 
networks through oversight of budgetary processes. In the Netherlands governance networks 
have evolved over time to become an increasingly important element of pluralist policy 
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making and implementation, but so far retaining a clear link to democratic authorities for 
purposes of accountability. In Denmark governance networks have become institutionalised 
as co-producers of policy and services, and there is a productive relationship between 
representative and participatory democracy.  
 
The case studies also highlight the importance of the varying national context in shaping the 
democratic anchorage of governance networks. The focus on two elements of democratic 
milieu - namely patterns of democracy and the strength of associationalism - allows us to 
establish the degree of cross-national variation more systematically. First, it seems that the 
relationship of governance networks to representative institutions is strongly shaped by what 
Lijphart calls patterns of democracy. There are striking parallels between Switzerland and the 
Netherlands, both countries that are traditionally characterised by consociationalism. Power 
sharing is widespread and governance networks have been worked into the traditional views 
and practices of cooperative policy making between the state, corporate interests and civil 
society actors. A similar situation is found in Denmark, where governance networks are 
rooted in a long-standing means of enhancing state civil-society cooperation. In these three 
countries, governance networks are not considered incompatible with pre-existing patterns of 
decision-making and policy delivery. Governance networks are nothing new in this respect; 
they simply extend pre-existing practices into new areas and blend in nicely with existing 
patterns of democracy. The United Kingdom presents a totally different picture. Here, the 
emergence of governance networks is a result of a top-down modernisation agenda of the 
national government, soon supported by a convergence of interest at the sub-national level 
(involving local politicians, public officials, business, community and nonprofits). In contrast 
to the three other countries, governance networks are something new; they disrupt the usual 
pattern of decision-making, centred on power concentration at the level of (national) 
representative institutions.  
 
Second, the relationship between governance networks and representative institutions also 
appears to be shaped by the vibrancy of the associational nexus that also varies across 
countries. There are again, interesting similarities and differences. Striking is the case of the 
United Kingdom, where weak associationalism has resulted in a limited ability of governance 
networks to resist instrumentalization by the governmental modernisation agenda. Attempts to 
instrumentalization of governance networks were also discernible in Switzerland, equally 
characterised by weak associationalism. In both cases government provided funds for capacity 
building, i.e. to help create non-governmental actors from scratch, in order to associate them 
into governance networks. The case studies suggest that instrumentalization succeeded in the 
UK, but not in Switzerland. While less discernible in the Netherlands or in Denmark, attempts 
at instrumentalization have not succeeded there either. But while in Switzerland, successful 
resistance of governance networks to instrumentalization is basically due to the weakness of 
governmental actors, in the Netherlands and Denmark, this can be attributed to the strength of 
the civil society. 
 
Taken together, these two contextual factors interact to produce peculiar relationships 
between governance networks and representative institutions. In the United Kingdom, the 
instrumental conjecture prevails. Although democratic oversight is limited, the power of 
elected politicians does not seem to be very much at stake, thanks to power concentration at 
the level of (national) representative institutions that behave as higher order meta-governors 
and, due to associational weakness, are able to effectively instrumentalize governance 
networks. At the other end of the spectrum, governance networks in Switzerland appear as 
just another locus of consociational power sharing. This is due to the weakness of 
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representative institutions - in the wider context of consensual patterns of decision-making - 
and the weakness of governance networks due to weak associationalism. This explains why 
the complementarity conjecture prevails. In the two other cases the Netherlands, and 
Denmark, governance networks play an important role in a more general transformation of 
decision-making patterns. In both countries, strong associationalism can be seen as a major 
driver for this transformation. In the Netherlands, strong governance networks in the context 
of a negotiating state facilitated tendencies towards pluralism and helped to break up 
corporatist decision-making. In Denmark, the growing importance of governance networks, 
and the involvement of civil-society actors into policy-making, relates to a more general 
process of transforming Danish democracy altogether. In both countries, the transitional 
conjecture prevails, as governance networks were strong enough to transform decision-
making and redefine democratic practice.  
 
These results from the four country studies also allow to conclude on the accuracy of the 
hypotheses formulated in the theoretical section above, regarding the likeliness of the four 
conjectures to occur in different democratic milieus. More precisely, we find that in a context 
of weak associationalism, the instrumental conjecture is likely to prevail in majoritarian 
democracies (United Kingdom) and the complementary conjecture in consensual democracies 
(Switzerland). In a context of strong associationalism (Denmark and the Netherlands) 
governance networks contribute to redefining and transforming democratic decision-making 
and thus make the transitional conjecture more likely. In the cases under scrutiny here, the 
prevailing transitional conjecture certainly has to do with the background of the consensual 
patterns of power sharing that is present in both countries. Hence, we are as yet unable to 
assess whether, in a majoritarian democracy characterised by strong associationalism, the 
incompatibility conjecture is more likely than any other. Nevertheless, the analysis of the 
Netherlands can be viewed a case in point - more majoritarian than Denmark - as the case 
study suggests that here, the incompatibility conjecture, though not prevailing, is present to 
some extent, as people call for stronger leadership by democratically elected politicians.  
 
This four country analysis has also surfaced the dynamic nature of the context or democratic 
milieu in which governance networks operate. This has implications for the relationship 
between governance networks and democratic anchorage as indicated by the conjectural 
possibilities associated with the current and future conditions identified for each of our cases. 
Interestingly the case studies reveal how countries operating in very different political 
contexts (United Kingdom and Switzerland) offer up the same combination of conjectures 
(instrumental and complementary), and how countries with rather longer experience of 
governance networks, but more similar political cultures (Denmark and the Netherlands), 
share concerns about the potential end point of the developments in governance networks, that 
is, the possibility of the „transitional‟ position leading to „incompatibility‟, if matters of 
democratic anchorage cannot be addressed.  
 
The normative implication of our study is that researchers into modes of governance need to 
pay more attention to the contextual features of the empirical cases they are studying, and in 
so doing to frame their conclusions with reference to relevant features of that context.  
Context is often used as a residual category to explain that which otherwise cannot be 
explained.  We have defined context in a particular way – as the democratic milieu – and thus 
enabled it to have more analytical purchase.  Out paper shows one way in which context 
could be included in cross-national comparative research, but there are other possibilities 
drawing on the rich interpretivist tradition in the study of public policy and governance.   
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Table 1: Four conjectures on the relationship of governance networks to democratic institutions 
Conjecture 1: Incompatible 2: Complementary 3: Transitional 4: Instrumental 
Characteristics     
Relationship of 
governance 
networks to 
representative 
democracy 
Governance networks 
challenge legitimacy and 
decision rules of representative 
democratic institutions 
Governance networks provide democratic 
institutions with additional linkages to society 
Governance networks offer greater flexibility and 
efficiency than representative democratic 
institutions, they will increase as the primary mode 
of societal decision-making, at the expense of 
representative democratic institutions 
Governance networks provide a means 
for representative democratic institutions 
to increase their authority in the face of 
societal complexity 
View of 
democracy 
Representative democracy 
should be the primary means of 
societal decision-making 
Representative democracy has primacy for 
decisions affecting fundamental values, but for 
other types of decisions it can co-exist with 
deliberative and participative democracy 
introduced through governance networks 
Representative democracy is being replaced by 
other modes of societal decision-making that reflect 
plural weighting of values in a diverse world  
Representative democracy reasserts itself, 
by working through procedures that are 
less subject to public scrutiny and 
accountability, and emphasising 
agreement over outputs rather than inputs 
to the decision process  
View of elected 
politicians 
Politicians are decisive at 
crucial points and their 
electoral authority should not 
be undermined by introducing 
alternative democratic modes 
Politicians try to cope with complexity by 
using networks to increase involvement in 
policy formulation, thus strengthening input 
legitimacy.   But at the same time their 
electoral authority gives them a special role in 
the goal setting process and means that they 
should be the final arbiters between competing 
views 
Politicians within a representative democratic 
system are unable to accommodate the 
complexities of the modern world; they should act 
as meta-governors (mediators and referees) 
Politicians try to cope with complexity by 
using governance networks as a means to 
control actors and realise policy, by 
emphasising output legitimacy and 
should be more „emphatic‟ to other actors  
View of 
accountability 
Primary accountability lies 
with the elected political 
officials (classical 
accountability) 
Accountability is shared between political 
office holders and other actors, multiple forms 
of accountability are added to the classical 
political accountability (performance 
indicators, boards, etc)  (shared accountability) 
Accountability is in the first place achieved by 
checks and balances in the decision-making 
process, by securing the openness of decision-
making and enhancing transparency of decision-
making by multiple forms of accountability 
(constructed accountability) 
Accountability is secured by the 
dominant role of elected politicians. 
Other forms of accountability (like 
performance indicators) are used by 
political official holders to control other 
actors and the decision-making process 
as a whole (instrumental accountability) 
View of 
decision-
making 
Decision-making takes place in 
closed networks that lack 
sufficient steering by or 
accountability to representative 
democratic institutions 
The increasing complexity of decision-making 
requires governance networks in order to bring 
relevant actors into the process; politicians 
should focus on the main decisions, and 
devolve lower level decisions to governance 
networks 
Modern society inherently is characterised by 
networks and complex decision-making with 
interdependencies; the information revolution and 
globalisation create new societal complexities; 
institutions created in the age of democracy are no 
longer adequate 
Decision-making is complex, but takes 
place under the „shadow of hierarchy‟. 
 
Source: Klijn and Skelcher (2007) 
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Table 2: Democratic milieus and the four conjectures 
Associationalism 
Pattern of democracy 
Weak Strong 
Majoritarian Instrumental conjecture Incompatibility conjecture 
Consensual Complementarity conjecture  Transitional conjecture 
 
Table 3: Democratic milieus of countries under scrutiny 
Associationalism 
Pattern of democracy 
Weak Strong 
Majoritarian United Kingdom  
 
Netherlands 
 
 
Consensual 
 
 
Switzerland 
Denmark 
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Table 4: Governance networks and representative democracy: comparative analysis of four European countries 
 
Nation United Kingdom Switzerland Netherlands Denmark 
Governance 
networks in 
pattern of 
democracy 
Governance networks creatures of Top-
down modernisation strategy by new 
national government.  
Governance network blend into traditional 
patterns of consociationalism and 
subsidiarity 
 
Gradual evolution from mid 20thC from 
pillarized decision structures to sectoral 
networks and now to governance networks 
and interactive decision making. 
Governance networks longstanding means 
of enhancing co-operation between strong 
state and civil society. Increasing 
enthusiasm for networks from 1980s. 
Governance 
network and 
associationalism 
Weak associationalism puts 
governmental actors into advantage and 
allows instrumentalization of 
governance networks.  
In spite of weak assoicationalism, 
governance networks successfully resist 
attempts of instrumentalization.  
Governance networks, thanks to strong 
associationalism contribute to increased 
pluralism. But tensions with recent 
tendencies to strengthen political 
leadership and representative institutions. 
Context of strong civil society conducive 
to increased citizen participation through 
governance networks.  
The power of 
elected politicians 
Variable and limited democratic 
oversight. Elected politicians are 
marginal to governance networks/ 
partnerships.  May have broad oversight 
role, but key actors are public managers 
working with considerable discretion 
but within broad political mandate. 
Democratic oversight through 
representative institutions and direct 
democracy at the end of decision 
processes. Elected politicians resist meta-
governing role and continue to interfere in 
governance networks. 
 
Democratic oversight through 
representative institutions at the end of the 
decision process. Politicians have limited 
though important roles in governance 
networks. Most significance paid to role of 
public managers in securing good 
processes for interactive decision making. 
New Public Management implies changed 
role for elected politicians to meta-
governors and new form of representative 
democracy. Experience of meta-
governance reveals more limited role for 
elected politicians and increased role for 
administrators. 
Relevant 
conjectures 
Instrumental conjecture offers main 
explanation both for origin of 
governance networks and their 
relationship to representative 
institutions. 
Complementary conjecture offers plausible 
account for the origin of governance 
networks as well as for the relationship 
with representative institutions.  
 
Complementary conjecture explains 
origins of governance networks. 
Transitional conjecture explains 
relationship to representative institutions 
with incompatibility conjecture a 
possibility if tensions between governance 
networks and representative democracy 
not resolved in process of transition. 
Complementary conjecture explains 
origins of governance networks. 
Relationship to representative institutions 
suggests transitional conjecture more 
relevant. Marginality of elected officials 
causes concern in relation to future 
democratic anchorage. 
 
 
 
 
